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Abstract 
 
In 2012, the European Court of Human Rights held, for the first time, that the 
discriminatory treatment of an individual on the grounds of his sexual orientation 
amounted to a violation of Article 3, alone and in conjunction with Article 14, of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. This judgment is highly significant given that 
individuals in Europe have been arguing since 1959 that forms of ill-treatment based on 
sexual orientation amount to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. In this article 
we provide a critical analysis of the evolution of the CourtÕs Article 3 jurisprudence in 
order to assess the ways in which this has developed the protection of sexual minorities 
in Europe. We identify major gaps in this protection, most notably in respect of asylum, 
and argue that the CourtÕs Article 3 jurisprudence should be further evolved to address 
these. Using the example of same-sex marriage, we conclude with a consideration of 
how sexual minorities might better and more creatively use Article 3 in the future to 
address discrimination against them.  
 
Keywords: Asylum, European Convention on Human Rights, Inhuman and degrading 
treatment, LGBT, Same-sex marriage, Sexual orientation discrimination 
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Introduction 
 
This article considers the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
 
 
(hereinafter Òthe CourtÓ) in respect of cases relating to sexual orientation discrimination 
that have involved Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter 
Òthe ConventionÓ).
1
 Article 3 of the Convention, which was designed by its drafters to 
stand for Òdecency and humanity and for civilisationÓ,
2
 provides the absolute guarantee 
that Ò[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishmentÓ. Given the scope of this guarantee, it would be reasonable to assume that 
Article 3 would have hitherto been a key provision for addressing the wide spectrum of 
ill-treatment to which individuals have been subjected because of their sexual 
orientation. However, it is striking that, since the Convention entered into force in 1953, 
Article 3 has rarely been utilized to address sexual orientation discrimination. 
Moreover, it was not until 2012 that a complaint brought under Article 3 about sexual 
orientation discrimination succeeded in the Court.  
 
The principal aims of this article are to provide a critical analysis of the evolution of the 
CourtÕs Article 3 jurisprudence in order to assess the ways in which this has developed 
the protection of sexual minorities in Europe and, moreover, to explore the ways in 
which Article 3 might be better utilized in the future to further enhance such protection. 
We consider that a more systematic and creative use of Article 3, by both applicants and 
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the Court, to address sexual orientation discrimination would be desirable for the 
following three reasons.  
 
First, Article 3 can address both the existence of homophobic relations in contemporary 
societies and their impact upon individuals in a way that is distinctly different to the 
other substantive provisions of the Convention. This is because Article 3 does not 
specify types of treatment that are prohibited or contain exceptions allowing ill-
treatment under particular circumstances. Rather, the open-ended wording of Article 3 
establishes that, regardless of the nature of the actions perpetrated against individuals 
and the circumstances under which they take place, any treatment or punishment that is 
ÒinhumanÓ or ÒdegradingÓ may amount to a violation of the Convention. This means 
that Article 3 provides a method to condemn, in absolute and unqualified terms, a wide 
range of discriminatory social practices directed at sexual minorities. 
 
Secondly, the applicability and scope of Article 3 is not circumscribed in respect of 
particular areas of social life. Article 3 does not require any treatment complained of by 
an individual to fall within a particular ambit such as, as is the case with Article 8 of the 
Convention, Òprivate and family lifeÓ. Article 3, therefore, has the capacity to capture a 
wide range of physical and psychological suffering experienced by sexual minorities in 
European societies that might not otherwise fall within the scope of the other 
substantive provisions of the Convention. Consequently, Article 3 provides a means to 
expand Convention jurisprudence to more effectively address discrimination against 
sexual minorities.  
	4	
Thirdly, and in this vein, Article 3 provides the means to develop Convention 
jurisprudence in ways that more holistically and comprehensively address sexual 
orientation discrimination in contemporary societies. The scope of Article 3 provides a 
framework to enable a more sociological understanding of and response to the variety of 
ways in which discrimination against sexual minorities is socially organized and 
experienced. Article 3 can, for example, be used as a framework for conceptualizing 
how certain forms of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation diminishes the 
social status of sexual minorities, as both individuals and as a group, in ways that might 
incubate forms of ill-treatment against them.  
 
We begin the article by considering why Article 3 has not previously been more 
consistently invoked in complaints to the Court about sexual orientation discrimination. 
To assess the scope for making such complaints, we go on to examine the CourtÕs 
general approach to interpreting Article 3 and, in particular, its notion that any ill-
treatment must attain a minimum level of severity to fall within this aspect of the 
Convention. We then provide a critical account of the CourtÕs extant jurisprudence on 
Article 3 and sexual orientation discrimination and consider the evolution of this 
jurisprudence up to the point that the Court held for the first time, in 2012, that a form 
of ill-treatment on the grounds of sexual orientation amounted to a violation of Article 
3, alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.
3
 We go on to analyse 
recent developments in the CourtÕs jurisprudence since 2012 which have, on the one 
hand, increased the positive obligations on national authorities to protect sexual 
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minorities from discrimination in European states
4
 but, on the other hand, have 
maintained an absence of protection for sexual minority asylum seekers attempting to 
resist deportation to states outside the Council of Europe (hereinafter Òthe CoEÓ) that 
criminalize same-sex sexual acts. Finally, using discrimination in respect of marriage as 
an example, we demonstrate how Article 3 might be better and more creatively used in 
the future to expand the protection of sexual minorities in European societies. 
 
Article 3 and sexual orientation discrimination: a historical perspective  
 
In the six decades that gay men and lesbians have been making complaints about sexual 
orientation discrimination to the Court and the former European Commission of Human 
Rights (hereinafter Òthe CommissionÓ) Article 3 has been invoked in only 55 cases 
(which includes, as we explain below, a large number of repetitive cases brought under 
uncommon circumstances). From a socio-legal perspective, the relative scarcity of 
Article 3 complaints relating to sexual orientation discrimination raises a number of 
questions about the dynamics which underpin its use by both applicants and the Court. 
To understand why Article 3 has not figured more prominently in complaints about 
sexual orientation discrimination it is useful to consider the evolution of its use over 
time.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the temporal evolution of the use of Article 3 in complaints relating 
to sexual orientation discrimination since 1959. These data reveal a distinct trend: in the 
earliest years that the Convention was in force, Article 3 was invoked in five cases 
between 1959 and 1962 (more than one per year) and then fell out of use completely for 
nearly two decades between 1963 and 1982. Moreover, between 1983 and 1995 only 
one applicant claimed to have been exposed to ill-treatment on the grounds of sexual 
orientation that was in violation of Article 3. From 1996 onwards, Article 3 has been 
invoked in complaints about sexual orientation discrimination with greater frequency 
and, in 2005 and 2012, reached the peak of being invoked in 19 and five complaints 
respectively. 
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    Figure 2 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the limited use of Article 3 in sexual orientation discrimination 
complaints is in marked contrast to the general expansion of complaints about such 
discrimination using other substantive provisions of the Convention. In the two decades, 
between 1980 and 2000, when the private life limb of Article 8 of the Convention 
became the ÒpowerhouseÓ for attempting to address a wide range of issues relating to 
sexual orientation discrimination
5
 very few applicants sought to frame their experience 
of discrimination as a form of ill-treatment within the meaning of Article 3.   
 
The lack of Òtake-upÓ of Article 3 in applications concerning sexual orientation 
discrimination might be the result of decisions taken by the former Commission in 
respect of the earliest applications of this type that invoked Article 3. The five 
applications, shown in Figure 1, that were lodged with the Commission between 1959 
and 1962, which invoked Article 3 in complaints against Austria or Germany about the 
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criminalization of male homosexual acts, were all declared inadmissible.
6
 It is 
reasonable to assume that a combination of the outright failure of the use of Article 3 in 
these cases, as well as the subsequent gradual recognition that issues relating to sexual 
orientation belonged to the sphere of Òprivate lifeÓ covered by Article 8,
7
 led applicants 
and their legal professionals to cease regarding Article 3 as a viable option for 
addressing discrimination based on sexual orientation. For example, although the 
applicant in Dudgeon v the United Kingdom had been subjected to insulting
8
 and 
humiliating
9
 remarks about his sexual orientation when questioned by the police, which 
had resulted in Òpsychological injury and harmÓ,
10
 Article 3 was not invoked in the 
application. Similarly, although the applicant in Alekseyev v Russia
11
 had been subjected 
to various forms of verbal abuse by public authorities (including the mayor of Moscow, 
who reportedly referred to homosexuality as ÒsatanicÓ) and arrest,
12
 no use was made of 
Article 3. 
 
As Figures 1 and 2 show, there has been an upward trend in the use of Article 3 in 
sexual orientation discrimination complaints since the middle of the 1990s. However, 
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the peak reached in 2005 is the outcome of uncommon circumstances and can be 
considered as an outlier that has not significantly affected the use of Article 3 in 
complaints related to sexual orientation discrimination. This peak is the result of the 
CourtÕs acknowledgment, in Smith and Grady v the United Kingdom,
13
 that the 
investigation and discharge of gay and lesbian personnel from the armed forces on the 
grounds of their sexual orientation amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the 
Convention. As a consequence of this, a significant number of British gay men and 
lesbians discharged from the armed forces lodged applications with the Court and, in 20 
of the 25 applications lodged between 2003 and 2005, the applicants unsuccessfully 
invoked Article 3 in ways similar to that in Smith and Grady.
14
 If these applications are 
discounted, the upward trend is due, in large part, to an increase in applications lodged 
by asylum seekers in CoE states who complain that, if returned to their country of origin 
(outside of the CoE), they would be subjected to ill-treatment in violation of Article 3 
because of their sexual orientation. Between 1996 and 2016, 14 of the 29 applications 
concerning sexual orientation discrimination that invoked Article 3 (which is the total 
number, discounting those applications lodged between 2003 and 2005 concerning the 
British armed forces) were lodged by asylum seekers. Moreover, the use of Article 3 in 
applications addressing sexual orientation discrimination that were lodged with the 
Court in both 2015 and 2016 was limited exclusively to issues raised by foreign 
nationals. Therefore, it remains the case that Article 3 has rarely been used in 
complaints by nationals of CoE states complaining about ÒdomesticÓ treatment that they 
regard to be discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.  
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The limited use of Article 3 in sexual orientation discrimination complaints shows that 
there has been very little interest among applicants in attempting to utilize this provision 
in innovative ways to evolve Convention jurisprudence. This is in marked contrast to 
the use of other provisions of the Convention where there is an on-going attempt by 
applicants to redefine and reshape the meaning and scope of protection. For example, 
Article 8, in conjunction with Article 14, remains the central focus of sexual orientation 
discrimination complaints and the concept of Òprivate lifeÓ is used as a malleable 
apparatus to deal with a wide range of issues touching upon the lives of sexual 
minorities. Similarly, although to a lesser extent, there have been attempts to use Article 
12 in creative ways to address forms of discrimination against same-sex couples. 
However, no such creative use has been made of Article 3 by applicants or by the 
CourtÕs judges during the adjudication of complaints about sexual orientation 
discrimination. The reason for this is either that the majority of applicants who have 
experienced sexual orientation discrimination are convinced that such discrimination is 
neither inhuman or degrading or, as seems more likely to be the case, applicants 
continue to tend to frame their complaints within the parameters set by Convention 
jurisprudence in order to maximise their chances of success under other Articles.  
 
The CourtÕs approach to Article 3 
 
Before we go on to explore the CourtÕs Article 3 jurisprudence in respect of sexual 
orientation discrimination it is worth examining the CourtÕs general approach to 
considering complaints brought under this aspect of the Convention. The Court has 
determined that Article 3 secures the absolute and unqualified right not to be subjected 
	11	
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment Òirrespective of the 
victimÕs conductÓ
15
 and that there can be no derogation from its provisions even in Òthe 
event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nationÓ.
16
 In one of the earliest 
attempts to define and delimit the textual meaning of the terms ÒtortureÓ and Òinhuman 
or degrading treatmentÓ contained in Article 3, the Commission stated, 
 
[i]t is plain that there may be treatment to which all these descriptions apply, for all 
torture must be inhuman and degrading treatment, and inhuman treatment also 
degrading. The notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as 
deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which, in the particular 
situation, is unjustifiable. The word ÒtortureÓ is often used to describe inhuman 
treatment, which has a purpose, such as the obtaining of information or confessions, or 
the infliction of punishment, and it is generally an aggravated form of inhuman 
treatment. Treatment or punishment of an individual may be said to be degrading if it 
grossly humiliates him before others or drives him to act against his will or 
conscience.
17
 
 
Torture, therefore, must generally be deliberate
18
 and purposive
19
 and, even if not 
planned in detail, Òthe element of purpose suggests that the minimum degree of fault 
required for torture should lie somewhere between recklessness and premeditationÓ.
20
 
Treatment may be considered inhuman if it, inter alia, is ÒpremeditatedÓ, Òapplied for 
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hours at a stretchÓ and causes Òeither actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental 
sufferingÓ.
21
 Whilst inhuman treatment is always degrading, a form of treatment may be 
regarded as degrading but not as inhuman. The borderline between inhuman and 
degrading treatment may prove difficult to determine but, throughout its jurisprudence, 
the Court has set out a number of parameters that distinguish degrading forms of 
treatment. The Court has held treatment to be degrading,   
 
if it causes in its victim feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority [É], if it humiliates or 
debases an individual (humiliation in the victimÕs own eyes [É], and/or in other 
peopleÕs eyes [É]), whether or not that was the aim [É], if it breaks the personÕs 
physical or moral resistance or drives him or her to act against his or her will or 
conscience [É], or if it shows a lack of respect for, or diminishes, human dignity.
22
 
 
However, as has been pointed out on several occasions,
23
 Article 3 has not lent itself to 
precise definition or application by the Court. 
 
Given the wide spectrum of actions potentially covered by Article 3, which range from 
the infliction of bodily harm to the humiliation of individuals, it would be reasonable to 
assume that a significant number of ÒhomophobicÓ actions would be deemed to fall 
within its scope. However, a key reason why the Court and the former Commission 
have repeatedly rejected complaints by gay men and lesbians brought under Article 3 is 
																																								 																				
21
 Kudla v Poland ECHR 2000-XI, para 92. 
22
 M.C. and A.C. v Romania App no 12060/12 (ECtHR, 12 April 2016), para 108. 
23
 Antonio Cassese, ÒProhibition of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or PunishmentÓ in 
Ronald J. MacDonald, Franz Matscher and Herbert Petzold (eds), The European System for the 
Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 1993); Michael K. Addo and Nicholas Grief, ÒDoes 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Enshrine Absolute Rights?Ó [1998] 9 European 
Journal of International Law 510. 
	13	
because of the stringent application of the principle that any treatment complained of 
Òmust attain a minimum level of severityÓ if it is to fall within the scope of this aspect 
of the Convention.
24
 In this respect, the Court has generally attempted to maintain a 
high threshold for this minimum in order not to trivialize the substance of Article 3 or 
encourage Òrights inflationÓ under it. However, the Court has recognized that 
determining the threshold is relative and depends on the assessment of Òall the 
circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental 
effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victimÓ.
25
 Moreover, 
having regard to the fact that the Convention is a living instrument that must be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions, the Court has also recognized that the 
minimum level of severity for each aspect of Article 3 changes over time: 
 
the Court considers that certain acts which were classified in the past as Òinhuman and 
degrading treatmentÓ as opposed to ÒtortureÓ could be classified differently in future. It 
takes the view that the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the 
protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably 
requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic 
societies.
26
 
 
Because the threshold of Article 3 is relative, it has been possible to utilize this aspect of 
the Convention to address the subjective effects of discrimination based on, for 
example, ÒraceÓ. For instance, in Moldovan and Others v Romania (no 2), which 
concerned the living conditions of and discrimination against a group of Roma villagers, 
																																								 																				
24
 Bouyid v Belgium [GC] ECHR 2015, para 86. 
25
 Ireland v the United Kingdom (1978) Series A no 25, para 162. 
26
 Selmouni v France ECHR 1999-V, para 101. 
	14	
the Court paid particular attention to the Ògeneral attitude of the authoritiesÓ, which 
caused the applicants Òconsiderable mental suffering, thus diminishing their human 
dignity and arousing in them such feelings as to cause humiliation and debasementÓ.
27
 
Specifically, the Court held that,  
 
remarks concerning the applicantsÕ honesty and way of life made by some authorities 
dealing with the applicantsÕ grievances [É] appear to be, in the absence of any 
substantiation on behalf of those authorities, purely discriminatory [and]  discrimination 
based on race can of itself amount to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 
3 of the Convention.
28
 
 
The CourtÕs acknowledgement that forms of discrimination based on race can attain the 
minimum level of severity to be classified as degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 
has, as we explore below, provided a foundation on which to make similar claims in 
respect of sexual orientation. 
 
Article 3 and sexual orientation discrimination: the road to X v Turkey 
 
Between the point of the first Article 3 complaint relating to sexual orientation 
discrimination in 1959
29
 and the point that the Court first upheld such a complaint in 
2012,
30
 both the Court and former Commission had shown a remarkable unwillingness 
to recognize that homophobic treatment amounted to a violation of any aspect of Article 
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3. For this reason, this aspect of Convention jurisprudence could be said to have 
evolved very little over 53 years. However, an examination of the CommissionÕs 
decisions and CourtÕs judgments reveals certain dynamic shifts in Convention 
jurisprudence during that period which, we would argue, ultimately led to the CourtÕs 
judgment in X v Turkey in 2012.
31
  
 
The foundations of Article 3 jurisprudence in respect of sexual orientation 
discrimination are the CommissionÕs early decisions in respect of complaints made by 
applicants alleging that they had suffered inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment as a result of the criminalization of same-sex sexual acts. In these early 
cases the Commission tended to largely ignore the applicantsÕ complaints, treating them 
as Òabsurd or frivolous applicationsÓ
32
 that should not be transmitted to governments. 
For example, in applications against Germany which contained Article 3 complaints 
relating to the existence and enforcement of criminal law that prohibited all sexual acts 
between men, the Commission tended to simply state that the existence of such law and 
punishments resulting from it were Òin no way in contradiction with the provisions of 
the ConventionÓ.
33
 Similarly, the Commission rejected the Article 3 complaint of an 
Austrian citizen, convicted under criminal laws prohibiting homosexual sexual acts, 
regarding disciplinary penalties imposed on him whilst in prison for voicing his 
disapproval of the laws under which he was convicted.
34
 These decisions reflected the 
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CommissionÕs more general approach of, until the mid 1970s, declaring inadmissible 
any complaint made under any provision of the Convention about the criminalization 
and punishment of same-sex sexual acts. The CommissionÕs early approach was lauded 
at the outset by the CoEÕs Directorate on Human Rights who regarded it as evidence 
that the Commission was equipped to Òensure observance of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms [É] without thereby opening the door to abuses prejudicial to the 
effectiveness of its work and to the legitimate interests of governmentsÓ.
35
 
 
Following the milestone judgment in Dudgeon v the United Kingdom,
36
 in which the 
Court acknowledged that Article 8 of the Convention secures the human right to engage 
in private and consensual same-sex sexual acts without the risk of prosecution, the 
Commission continued to ignore applications brought under Article 3 regarding sexual 
orientation discrimination. For example, the Commission paid no attention to the 
substance of an Article 3 complaint lodged in 1983 in which the applicant, following his 
arrest and conviction for homosexual offences (and passport forgery) in Morocco, 
complained that the German diplomatic services did not intervene to protect him while 
he was in prison and thereby exposed him to the risk of torture and inhuman 
conditions.
37
 However, by the late 1990s, the CourtÕs approach to sexual orientation 
discrimination complaints under Article 3 began to show limited signs of evolution. In 
Smith and Grady v the United Kingdom,
38
 the Court rejected the applicantsÕ complaint 
under Article 3 but conceded that it Òwould not exclude that treatment which is 
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grounded upon a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a 
homosexual minority [É] could, in principle, fall within the scope of Article 3Ó.
39
 
Whilst the Court accepted that the policy of prohibiting gay men and lesbians from 
serving in the armed forces, combined with the investigation and discharge of the 
applicants, was Òundoubtedly distressing and humiliatingÓ, it did not consider that the 
treatment reached the minimum level of severity to bring it within the scope of Article 
3.
40
 
 
Smith and Grady can be seen as a ÒtransitionalÓ judgment in which the Court 
acknowledged that certain forms of ÒbiasÓ against individuals on the grounds of sexual 
orientation could, in principle, amount to a violation of Article 3. In the subsequent case 
of Stasi v France, which concerned the ill-treatment of a gay man in prison by other 
inmates, the Court took the further step of acknowledging that the ill-treatment 
complained of, which had resulted from a predisposed bias based on sexual orientation, 
did reach the threshold required by Article 3.
41
 However, the Court held that there had 
been no violation of Article 3 in this case because the prison authorities had taken 
reasonable measures in respect of every allegation made by the applicant and that they 
could not be considered responsible for incidents that the applicant had failed to 
report.
42
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The year after the judgment in Stasi the Court issued two judgments that finally evolved 
its jurisprudence to provide sexual minorities with protection under Article 3. In the first 
of these judgments, in the case of Zontul v Greece, the Court held that the rape by 
means of a truncheon
43
 of a gay man by a public official whilst he was detained as an 
illegal immigrant was torture within the terms of Article 3 and that the inadequate 
redress afforded to him by national authorities amounted to a procedural violation of the 
same provision.
44
 In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not pay significant attention 
to the applicantÕs sexual orientation and, consequently, its reasoning was not especially 
innovative in respect of the relationship between forms of ill-treatment and sexual 
orientation discrimination. However, 10 months later, when the Court issued its 
judgment in the case of X v Turkey, it did pay particular attention to the link between the 
ill-treatment complained of by the applicant and his sexual orientation. The applicant, a 
gay man serving a prison sentence for forgery,
45
 complained that, on account of his 
sexual orientation, he had been placed in an individual Òvery dirty and rat-infestedÓ
46
 
cell for more than thirteen months which had had an irreparable and irreversible effect 
on his mental and physical health.
47
 He stated that his conditions of detention were 
similar to those generally intended for disciplinary measures against inmates accused of 
paedophilia or rape
48
 and the Court observed that they were Òstricter than the Turkish 
prison regime for prisoners serving whole-life imprisonmentÓ.
49
 Significantly, not only 
did the Court consider that the condition of the applicantÕs detention amounted to 
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inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 3, but it also held that the 
applicant had Òsuffered discrimination on grounds of his sexual orientationÓ in violation 
of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 3.
50
 The Court reached this judgment on 
the basis that it regarded the applicantÕs sexual orientation as Òthe main reasonÓ for 
placing him in conditions considered to be inhuman and degrading.
51
 
 
X v Turkey can be seen as establishing a new, strong framework for holding national 
authorities to account for sexual orientation discrimination in respect of their positive 
obligations under Article 3 in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. The 
judgment establishes that the conduct of national authorities can amount to sexual 
orientation discrimination even when such discrimination is not intentional.
52
 If national 
authorities fail Òto take all possible measures to determine whether or not a 
discriminatory attitude had played a role in adopting [a particular] measureÓ then this 
can amount to a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 3.
53
 Moreover, 
such a violation can be deemed to have occurred without having to determine whether 
the person who is the subject of any ill-treatment is being treated less favourably, 
without an objective or reasonable justification, than persons in a relevantly similar 
situation (which is a requirement that the Court often imposes when assessing 
complaints about a difference in treatment under Article 14).
54
 The judgment also 
reiterates in the strongest terms that Ò[i]f the reasons advanced for a difference in 
treatment were based solely on the applicantÕs sexual orientation, this would amount to 
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discrimination under the ConventionÓ
55
 and reminds national authorities that they 
cannot justify any ill-treatment of an individual on the grounds of their sexual 
orientation on the basis that it was Òfor his own protectionÓ
56
 without undertaking Òan 
adequate assessment of the risk posed to the [individualÕs] safetyÓ.
57
 The net result of 
the judgment in X v Turkey is the effective broadening of the range of ill-treatment 
deemed to fall within the ambit of Article 3 and the narrowing of the margin of 
appreciation available to contracting states under Article 14 to justify such ill-treatment. 
The judgment therefore represents a watershed in the CourtÕs jurisprudence on sexual 
orientation discrimination which, as we explore below, has been subject to further 
evolution during the last five years.  
 
Beyond X v Turkey: addressing ÒhatredÓ 
 
Since the judgment in X v Turkey, the Court has significantly and rapidly developed the 
interplay between Article 3 and Article 14 of the Convention in its jurisprudence 
concerning forms of ill-treatment against sexual minorities that are based on ÒhatredÓ. 
In Alekseyev v Russia, the Court had previously established, under Article 11 (alone and 
in conjunction with Article 14), the right to assemble peacefully in public Òto promote 
respect for human rights and freedoms and to call for tolerance towards sexual 
																																								 																				
55
 X v Turkey App no 24626/09 (ECtHR, 9 October 2012), para 50. This formulation derives from E.B. v 
France [GC] App no 43546/02 (ECtHR, 22 January 2008) para 93, and Kozak v Poland App no 13102/02 
(ECtHR, 2 March 2010) para 92. The Court does not always use such strong wording. For instance, in 
Karner v Austria ECHR 2003-IX, para 37, and Schalk and Kopf v Austria ECHR 2010, para 97, the Court 
held more generally that Òdifferences based on sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by 
way of justificationÓ. 
56
 X v Turkey App no 24626/09 (ECtHR, 9 October 2012), para 47. 
57
 ibid, para 56. 
	21	
minoritiesÓ.
58
 In Identoba and Others v Georgia and M.C. and A.C. v Romania, the 
Court addressed the hostile response that sexual minorities often face when they 
assemble in public for these purposes. Significantly, in these cases, the Court dealt with 
hostility directed towards sexual minorities in public under Article 3 in conjunction with 
Article 14. In doing so, the Court examined the threshold at which homophobic hatred 
triggers Article 3
59
 and clarified the substantive and procedural obligations pending on 
national authorities. The Court also examined the extent to which, in the event of 
inhuman or degrading treatment against sexual minorities, the failure of national 
authorities to comply with all of the obligations placed on them can amount to 
discrimination within the meaning of Article 14. 
 
In Identoba and Others v Georgia, the applicants (a non-governmental organization and 
fourteen individuals) complained that, while attending a march to mark the International 
Day against Homophobia in Tbilisi, Òthey were met [É] by a hundred or more counter-
demonstratorsÓ and Òwere subjected to threats of physical assault and to insultsÓ.
60
 
Pursuant to Georgian law, the applicant organization had previously informed national 
authorities about the day, the timing and the planned route of the march, and had been 
assured that police forces would be deployed to ensure that the procession took place 
peacefully.
61
 However, at the point that the applicants were attacked, they received no 
immediate assistance from the police and, when the police eventually intervened after 
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approximately twenty or thirty minutes,
62
 they arrested four of the applicants with the 
alleged aim of protecting them from the counter-demonstrators.
63
 Subsequently, the 
applicants filed several criminal complaints requesting that investigations be conducted 
into the attacks against them and into the failure of the police to adequately protect them 
from the attacks, but these met with such responses as, since Òthere were no signs of 
illegality in the actions of the police during the demonstration, there was no need to 
launch an investigation against them for abuse of powerÓ and that two of the attackers 
has been deemed to have committed a Òminor breach of public orderÓ.
64
 
 
In M.C. and A.C. v Romania, the applicants complained about the response of national 
authorities to an attack upon them on a metro train after they had attended the annual 
gay march in Bucharest. The applicants were attacked by a group of seven people who 
subjected them to physical violence and verbal homophobic abuse.
65
 The applicants 
argued that the response of the authorities was unsatisfactory because, when they 
complained to the police about the attack, the police tried Òto dissuade them from 
pursuing their complaintÓ
66
 and when they filed a criminal complaint the police 
terminated the investigation before any criminal suspect was prosecuted. 
 
In both Identoba and Others and M.C. and A.C., the Court made an effort to clarify the 
general principles underlying its approach to the interplay between Article 3 and Article 
14 in respect of sexual orientation discrimination. In Identoba and Others, reiterating 
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that Article 3 covers acts of physical ill-treatment as well as the infliction of 
psychological suffering, the Court recalled that,  
 
discriminatory treatment as such can in principle amount to degrading treatment within 
the meaning of Article 3 where it attains a level of severity such as to constitute an 
affront to human dignity. More specifically, treatment which is grounded upon a 
predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority 
may, in principle, fall within the scope of Article 3.
67
  
 
Moreover, national authorities, when investigating allegations of ill-treatment under 
Article 3, Òhave the duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask possible discriminatory 
motivesÓ
68
 because Ò[t]reating violence and brutality with a discriminatory intent on an 
equal footing with cases that have no such overtones would be turning a blind eye to the 
specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rightsÓ and this 
Òmay constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the 
ConventionÓ.
69
 In M.C. and A.C., the Court reiterated that the absence of direct 
responsibility for acts of violence of such severity to engage Article 3 did not absolve 
the state from all obligations under this provision, noting that ÒArticle 3 requires that the 
authorities conduct an effective [É] investigation into the alleged ill-treatment, even if 
such treatment has been inflicted by private individualsÓ.
70
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The Court applied these general principles in Identoba and Others and M.C. and A.C 
and, in doing so, expanded the jurisprudence on sexual orientation discrimination 
established in X v Turkey. The Court redefined the threshold of Article 3 to take into 
account the combined effect of Òhate speech and aggressive behaviourÓ which created a 
situation of Òintense fear and anxietyÓ for the applicants.
71
 The Court stated that the 
Òfeelings of fear, anguish and insecurityÓ experienced by the applicants, which was the 
result of treatment directed at them because of their ÒidentityÓ, was incompatible with 
respect for their human dignity and reached the threshold of severity to fall within the 
ambit of Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14.
72
 In Identoba and Others, the 
Court considered that the failure of national authorities to meet the positive obligations 
placed upon them to provide the applicants with heightened protection from attacks by 
private individuals, and the fact that Òthe belated police intervention shifted onto the 
arrest and evacuation of some of the applicants, the very victims whom they had been 
called to protectÓ,
73
 amounted to a violation of Article 3 taken in conjunction with 
Article 14. Finally, in both Identoba and Others and M.C. and A.C., the Court held that 
national authorities had fallen short of their procedural obligation to carry out an 
investigation of the incidents complained of Òwith particular emphasis on unmasking 
the bias motive and identifying those responsible for committing the homophobic 
violenceÓ.
74
 This failure, the Court concluded, amounted to a violation of Article 3 
taken in conjunction with Article 14.  
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The judgments in Identoba and Others and M.C. and A.C. represent a further watershed 
in the CourtÕs jurisprudence on sexual orientation discrimination. The Court has made 
clear that, if authorities do not take a Òrigorous approachÓ to investigating Òprejudice-
motivated crimesÓ then this amounts to ÒindifferenceÓ which is Òtantamount to official 
acquiescence to, or even connivance with, hate crimesÓ.
75
 From a sociological point of 
view, this can be seen to send a highly significant message to gay men and lesbians 
living in societies that are hostile to them, and to national authorities who are either 
indifferent towards or complicit with violence against sexual minorities. The message is 
that not only are national authorities obliged to refrain from directly and indirectly 
discriminating against sexual minorities in ways that might amount to ill-treatment in 
violation of Article 3, but that they are also obliged to intervene in and address 
manifestations of hate-based ill-treatment against gay men and lesbians. 
 
A major gap in Article 3 jurisprudence: the failure to protect gay asylum seekers 
 
In contrast to the evolving Article 3 jurisprudence on hatred towards sexual minorities 
in European societies, the approach of the Court to addressing problems experienced by 
gay men and lesbians seeking to escape from hatred directed towards them in countries 
outside of the CoE has remained static. Significantly, the Court has never upheld a 
complaint by a gay or lesbian Òasylum seekerÓ alleging that, if deported to a country 
outside of the CoE, they would face a risk of ill-treatment on the grounds of their sexual 
orientation that would amount to a violation of Article 3. As we explained above, a 
significant number of the applications now received by the Court from gay men and 
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lesbians that invoke Article 3 are from asylum seekers who claim that, if returned to 
their country of origin outside the CoE, they would be exposed to ill-treatment on the 
grounds of their sexual orientation. Such applications are unsurprising given the 
widespread ill-treatment and punishment which sexual minorities are subjected to in 
states outside the CoE, and the difficulties they face during the examination and 
assessment of their applications for asylum in CoE states.
76
 However, the Court has not 
engaged in any dynamic interpretation of the Convention in respect of these issues and, 
as we explain below, has consistently refused to evolve its jurisprudence in this area, 
thus leaving a major gap in the protection offered to sexual minorities by the 
Convention system. 
 
The Court can be seen to have relied on at least three ÒstrategiesÓ to allow it to reject 
complaints by gay and lesbian asylum seekers brought under Article 3 about the risk of 
ill-treatment in their country of origin. The first strategy has been to ensure that the 
threshold of what constitutes ÒriskÓ under Article 3 is difficult for asylum seekers to 
reach. Although the Court has established that Article 3 places an obligation on a 
contracting state not to expel individuals to countries Òwhere substantial grounds have 
been shown for believing that the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk 
of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving countryÓ,
77
 it has 
also, in respect of complaints about sexual orientation discrimination, set a high 
threshold when assessing the existence of Òreal riskÓ. This has made it impossible for 
gay asylum seekers to successfully argue a case under Article 3. For example, in 
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response to complaints regarding the refoulement of gay asylum seekers, the Court has 
established that it is not sufficient to show that criminal laws exist in a country of origin 
that prohibit same-sex sexual acts, or that an applicant has been the subject of the 
enforcement of such law.
78
 Rather, it must be shown that there is Òa situation of active 
prosecution by the authorities of adults involved in consensual and private homosexual 
relationshipsÓ
79
 and that there are Òsubstantial groundsÓ for believing that if deported 
the applicant would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to 
Article 3.
80
  
 
In F v the United Kingdom, for instance, the Court emphasized that, although Iranian 
law criminalizes all same-sex acts and makes particular acts punishable by death, in 
Iranian society there is a certain toleration for same-sex sexual activities and that 
Islamic law is not concerned with sexual acts committed Òin the privacy of the homeÓ.
81
 
As a consequence, the Court dismissed the applicantÕs claim Ð that, whilst there was 
under-reporting of executions and floggings for homosexual offences, there had been a 
series of documented cases where men had received sentences of capital and corporal 
punishment for engaging in same-sex sexual acts Ð as a Òtenuous and hypothetical basis 
on which to assess the likelihood of Article 3 treatment occurringÓ.
82
 The Court adopted 
a similar approach in M.E. v Sweden, which concerned a Libyan citizen who had 
claimed asylum in Sweden on the grounds that, inter alia, he had married a Swedish 
man.
83
 Although Libyan criminal law makes all same-sex sexual acts punishable by a 
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term of imprisonment of up to five years
84
 and despite several independent sources 
confirming violence perpetrated against sexual minorities,
85
 the Court reiterated that 
Òthe mere possibility of ill-treatment on account of an unsettled situation in the 
receiving country does not in itself give rise to a breach of Article 3Ó
86
 and concluded 
that a temporary relocation of the applicant to Libya did not infringe the applicantÕs 
rights under Article 3.
87
 
 
In its most recent jurisprudence the Court appears to have further raised the threshold 
for what constitutes real risk under Article 3.
88
 For example, in A.N. v France, which 
concerned a Senegalese citizen seeking asylum in France on the basis of having been 
subjected to blackmail, harassment and violence in Senegal because of his sexual 
orientation,
89
 the Court examined credible reports that provisions in the Senegal Penal 
Code making same-sex acts a criminal offence were enforced and that there had been a 
resurgence of homophobia
90
 in the name of traditional values and Islam.
91
 However, the 
Court decided that the applicant had not produced sufficient evidence capable of 
demonstrating that he would be exposed to a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 if 
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returned to Senegal.
92
 Such a finding raises the question of whether it is possible for a 
gay asylum seeker in these circumstances to produce any evidence that the Court would 
find acceptable.  
 
The second strategy of the Court to reject complaints by gay and lesbian asylum seekers 
brought under Article 3 has involved it deploying the idea that sexual minorities can 
take measures to conceal their sexual orientation in order to avoid ill-treatment. In M.E. 
v Sweden, for example, when considering the risks created by temporarily returning the 
applicant to Libya, the Court stated that even if he Òwould have to be discreet about his 
private life during this time, it would not require him to conceal or supress an important 
part of his identity permanently or for any longer period of timeÓ.
93
 It is clear, therefore, 
that a gay man or lesbian who is forced to conform to a heteronormative model of 
sexuality, in order to avoid ill-treatment resulting from the bias of a majority of society, 
will not be deemed to be experiencing a form of suffering that reaches the threshold of 
Article 3. In other words, the Court will not accept the claim that returning a gay man or 
lesbian to a country in which they would live under the threat of imprisonment for 
engaging in a consensual, private and adult sexual relationship amounts to degrading 
treatment within the meaning of Article 3 because it would cause Òfeelings of fear, 
anguish and inferiorityÓ and would result in breaking Òthe personÕs physical or moral 
resistanceÓ or driving Òhim or her to act against his or her will or conscienceÓ.
94
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The third strategy of the Court to reject complaints by gay and lesbian asylum seekers 
brought under Article 3 has been to strike out applications when domestic authorities 
either grant an applicant a residence permit or undertake to re-examine their application 
for asylum.
95
 For example, in M.B. v Spain the Court considered a complaint by a 
citizen of Cameroon who had claimed asylum in Spain on the grounds that, inter alia, 
she had been threatened because of her sexual orientation.
96
 The applicantÕs attempt to 
gain asylum failed and, in the face of being removed to Cameroon by national 
authorities, she successfully applied to the Court for interim measures to be imposed 
that prevented her from being deported for the duration of all domestic legal 
proceedings. Following this, the Audiencia Nacional upheld an appeal by the applicant 
and ordered her application for asylum to be examined by the administrative authorities. 
The CourtÕs response was to partially strike the application out on the grounds that the 
applicantÕs application for asylum was being re-examined by the domestic authorities 
and she could not be deported during that period of examination, and to partially declare 
the application inadmissible on the grounds that the applicant had not exhausted 
domestic remedies.
97
 This decision can be regarded as problematic because, as the 
applicant pointed out, had the Court not applied the interim measures then she would 
have been deported whilst her domestic legal appeal was still pending. Although the 
domestic authorities had ultimately removed the immediate threat of deportation, the 
Court could have continued the examination of the case (as it is entitled to do under 
Article 37 of the Convention) in order to consider whether there was a Òstructural 
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problemÓ in Spain regarding asylum appeals
98
 which put the applicant, at the point that 
she was threatened with deportation, under real risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 
3. However, the Court decided that the actions of the domestic authorities amounted to 
the matter being resolved and, therefore, that the case should be struck out. This 
approach, which the Court has adopted in other similar cases,
99
 can be seen as a way to 
avoid ruling on the merits of such complaints.  
 
It could be argued that the CourtÕs overall approach is motivated by a desire to protect 
the national sovereignty of CoE states to determine their immigration policies and, 
moreover, to protect itself from an enormous amount of complaints from gay asylum 
seekers. If the Court upheld a complaint about the refoulement of a gay asylum seeker, 
it would establish the principle that CoE states must safeguard gay foreign nationals 
from ill-treatment in their country of origin and, consequently, this would curtail the 
capacity of states to control immigration. In such circumstances, CoE states may fear 
being ÒfloodedÓ with applications for asylum on the grounds of sexual orientation 
discrimination, including applications from those who cannot claim asylum on other 
grounds and so bogusly claim to be gay.
100
 The Court may fear that a large amount of 
these applications would end up coming to Strasbourg. If the CourtÕs motivation for 
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avoiding establishing jurisprudence that protects these sexual minorities is a way of 
accommodating such fears then it is not effectively carrying out its function to supervise 
the obligation placed on states to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights 
and freedoms defined in the Convention (Article 1). In simple terms, the CourtÕs current 
approach is arguably Òmore a question of politics than lawÓ.
101
  
 
Same-sex marriage and Article 3  
 
In this final section we explore how the CourtÕs Article 3 jurisprudence could be 
developed to address sexual orientation discrimination in respect of marriage. To date, 
Article 3 has never been invoked in a complaint about the lack of access to or legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage. This is perhaps unsurprising because the Court has 
interpreted the substantive provision on marriage enshrined in Article 12 of the 
Convention to be founded on the concept of a Òunion between partners of different 
sexÓ
102
 and has consistently held that it Òdoes not impose an obligation on [a] 
Government to grant a same-sex couple [É] access to marriageÓ.
103
 Consequently, there 
have been very few attempts to develop the CourtÕs jurisprudence on marriage to 
address discrimination against same-sex couples.
104
 Moreover, the CourtÕs refusal to 
compare unmarried same-sex couples and married different-sex couples for the 
purposes of considering complaints about discrimination based on sexual orientation 
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under Article 14 of the Convention
105
 has produced a Òtwo trackÓ approach: on the one 
hand, the Court continues to develop its jurisprudence on numerous aspects of sexual 
orientation discrimination in respect of private and family life (under Article 8) whilst, 
on the other hand, it maintains the inflexible view that same-sex couples have no 
recourse to being excluded from the rights and benefits attached to marriage (under 
Article 12).
106
 A key question for those who seek to evolve the human right to marry for 
same-sex couples, therefore, concerns how it might be possible to break down the 
ÒfirewallÓ that the Court has built around marriage.  
 
Article 3 provides a powerful mechanism by which to challenge the CourtÕs 
heteronormative interpretation of marriage and the Òseparate but equalÓ human rights 
regime that it has produced. Currently, same-sex couples can assert a right to have 
access to a Òspecific legal framework providing for the recognition and protection of 
their same-sex unionsÓ providing that this legal framework is not marriage.
107
 Article 3, 
in our opinion, offers the opportunity to address and eradicate this legal distinction from 
the standpoint of Òhuman dignityÓ. The close connection between the right to marry and 
respect for human dignity has been thoroughly explored by courts as well as by 
scholars.
108
 For example, writing about the United States of America, Martha Nussbaum 
argues that marriage operates as Òan agent of recognition or the granting of dignityÓ
109
 
and that Ò[t]o be told, ÔYou cannot get marriedÕ is [É] to be excluded from one of the 
																																								 																				
105
 See, for example: X and Others v Austria [GC] ECHR 2013-II, paras 105-110. 
106
 See: Paul Johnson, ÒMarriage, Heteronormativity, and the European Court of Human Rights: A 
ReappraisalÓ [2015] 29(1) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 56.  
107
 Oliari and Others v Italy App nos 18766/11 and 36030/11 (ECtHR, 21 July, 2015), para 185.  
108
 See, for example: William N. Eskridge, The Case for Same-Sex Marriage: From Sexual Liberty to 
Civilized Commitment (Free Press 1996); Robert Wintemute, ÒFrom ÔSex RightsÕ to ÔLove RightsÕ: 
Partnership Rights as Human RightsÓ, in N. Bamforth (ed), Sex Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 
2002 (Oxford University Press 2005) 186. 
109
 Martha C. Nussbaum, ÒA Right to MarryÓ [2010] 98(3) California Law Review 667, 669. 
	34	
defining rituals of the American life cycleÓ.
110
 The Constitutional Court of South Africa 
adopted a similar view when it held that excluding same-sex couples from the Òstatus, 
entitlements and responsibilitiesÓ of marriage represented a Òviolation of their right to 
dignityÓ and Òmanifestly affects their dignity as members of societyÓ.
111
 Similarly, the 
Supreme Court of the United States of America recognized that Òthe transcendent 
importance of marriageÓ is the Ònobility and dignityÓ it offers to couples and that same-
sex couples seeking access to marriage are asking Òfor equal dignity in the eyes of the 
lawÓ.
112
 The consequences of denying same-sex couples access to the dignity that 
marriage bestows is, as Nussbaum argues, Òstigmatizing and degradingÓ.
113
 Or, as the 
Supreme Court of the United States of America put it, Òlaws excluding same-sex 
couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injuryÓ.
114
 
 
Although, as we noted above, no same-sex couple has made a complaint to the Court 
under Article 3 regarding their exclusion from marriage, several applicants have 
highlighted that being denied access to a form of legal recognition for their same-sex 
relationships (either in form of marriage or civil partnership) has aroused in them 
feelings that could be argued to fall within the scope of Article 3. For example, the 
individual applicants in Vallianatos and Others v Greece, four same-sex couples, 
expressed their Òfeeling of exclusion and social marginalisationÓ created by a law that 
denied them the ability to enter into a civil partnership.
115
 In Oliari and Others v Italy, 
which concerned the inability of same-sex couples to gain any form of legal recognition 
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of their relationships, the applicants stated that Òthe recognition in law of oneÕs family 
life and status [is] crucial for the existence and well-being of an individual and for his or 
her dignityÓ
116
 and that Ò[t]o persist on denying certain rights to same-sex couples only 
continued to marginalise and stigmatise a minority group in favour of a majority with 
discriminatory tendenciesÓ.
117
 Clearly, what these applicants sought to stress to the 
Court is that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage or an equivalent form of 
legal recognition creates forms of subjective distress for same-sex couples that 
diminishes their human dignity. As such, same-sex couples could assert that the 
injurious effects of being excluded from marriage amount to degrading treatment within 
the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. 
 
The CourtÕs recent jurisprudence provides a basis for it to consider the exclusion of 
same-sex couples from marriage as a form of degrading treatment within the meaning of 
Article 3, and a form of discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 taken in 
conjunction with Article 3. The Court has acknowledged that Òsame-sex couples are just 
as capable as different-sex couples of entering into stable, committed relationshipsÓ and 
that Òsame-sex couples are in need of legal recognition and protection of their 
relationshipÓ.
118
 Furthermore, the Court has recognized the Òmomentous interestsÓ of 
same-sex couples who seek ÒrecognitionÓ and ÒlegitimacyÓ in law.
119
 It is on these 
foundations that the Court could go on to determine that the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from marriage amounts to a form of degrading and discriminatory treatment 
contrary to Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14. The Court could substantiate 
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that finding by recalling its established principle that treatment which is grounded upon 
a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority 
can fall within the scope of Article 3
120
 and draw upon its finding that treatment which 
creates Òfear, anxiety and insecurityÓ in gay men and lesbians amounts to a violation of 
Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14.
121
  
 
If the Court reached this conclusion it would signal an acceptance of the view that being 
denied access to marriage causes forms of personal suffering and humiliation that strike 
at the very essence of human dignity. For instance, when, due to an exclusion from the 
rights and benefits of marriage, a person has no legal right to visit their same-sex 
partner in hospital, or to decide or be informed about that partnerÕs medical treatment, 
that person could claim to experience Òfear, anxiety and insecurityÓ.
122
 Or when a 
person is denied the opportunity to form a legally binding parental bond with a child, 
such as through second-parent adoption, because such an opportunity is reserved for 
married, different-sex couples, that person could claim to experience suffering that 
breaks their moral resistance.
123
 There are an extensive number of ways in which, as a 
result of being excluded from marriage, same-sex couples suffer humiliation and 
debasement in their own eyes and the eyes of others, are driven to act against their will 
or conscience, are treated with a lack of respect, and are diminished in the societies in 
which they live.
124
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Some may argue that the claim that being denied access to marry amounts to degrading 
and discriminatory treatment contrary to Article 3 in conjunction with Article 14 is not 
feasible. They may argue that it is not feasible because the Court has interpreted Article 
12 as the Òlex specialis for the right to marryÓ
125
 and has held that the right to marry 
cannot be derived from an interpretation of other provisions of the Convention that have 
a more general purpose and scope
126
. However, in our view, the fact that the Court has 
determined that same-sex couples have no right to marry under the Convention does not 
prevent it from determining that denying same-sex couples the opportunity to marry 
amounts to a violation of Article 3. The fact that the Convention does not recognise the 
right to wear spectacles did not prevent the Court, in Slyusarev v Russia, declaring that 
depriving a prisoner of his reading glasses amounted to degrading treatment contrary to 
Article 3.
127
 Likewise, the fact that the Convention does not recognise the right of 
access to food or the right to sleep did not prevent the Court, in Strelets v Russia, 
declaring that depriving a prisoner Òof food on days he was transported to the court-
house, as well as [É] of adequate sleep between court hearingsÓ
128
 amounted to 
inhuman and degrading treatment. These findings neither infringe the principle that the 
Convention must be read Òas a wholeÓ and Òits Articles should therefore be construed in 
harmony with one anotherÓ,
129
 nor violate the principle that the Court must not 
introduce a right that was not intended when the Convention was drafted.
130
 Therefore, 
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we argue that the Court could determine that depriving same-sex couples of access to 
marriage amounts to a form of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 without recognising a 
right for same-sex couples to marry under Article 12. 
 
When the Court considers an application concerning the exclusion of same-sex couples 
from marriage, it is able to consider the substance of the complaint under Article 3 
regardless of whether this aspect of the Convention is invoked by the applicants. The 
CourtÕs jurisdiction, according to Article 32 of the Convention, extends Òto all matters 
concerning the interpretation and application of the ConventionÓ and, moreover, the 
Court is Òmaster of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the caseÓ and is 
not Òbound by the characterisation given by an applicantÓ.
131
 The Court could, 
therefore, take the initiative and consider the issue of excluding same-sex couples from 
marriage under Article 3 in order to analyse whether, as we have argued above, such 
exclusion amounts to a form of human degradation in violation of the Convention. This 
would provide it with the opportunity to consider the issue of same-sex marriage outside 
of the confines of Article 12 and, in doing so, avoid historical questions concerning 
whether the wording of the right to marry refers only to unions between men and 
women.
132
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Conclusions 
 
In this article, we have examined the CourtÕs jurisprudence in respect of cases relating 
to sexual orientation discrimination that have involved Article 3 of the Convention. In 
doing so, we have critically addressed the historical reluctance, by both applicants and 
the Court, to frame sexual orientation discrimination as Òinhuman or degrading 
treatmentÓ. We have examined the evolution of the CourtÕs interpretation of Article 3 in 
respect of sexual orientation discrimination and discussed the legal turning points that 
led to the Court finding in 2012 Ð 53 years after the introduction of the first Article 3 
complaint relating to sexual orientation discrimination Ð that a form of ill-treatment 
based on sexual orientation amounted to a violation of Article 3, alone and in 
conjunction with Article 14. We have also shown that, since that time, the Court has 
further evolved the interplay between Article 3 and Article 14 to address forms of Òhate 
crimeÓ against sexual minorities in Europe that constitute an affront to human dignity. 
 
Our principal aim has been to advocate for a more systematic and ÒcreativeÓ use of 
Article 3 to address sexual orientation discrimination. It is our view that Article 3 
should become more central to addressing the social exclusion, and the physical and 
psychological suffering, experienced by sexual minorities in CoE states. As such, we 
have critically examined the high threshold set by the Court when assessing under 
Article 3 the existence of real risk of refoulement to gay and lesbian asylum seekers and 
explored how the Court could develop its jurisprudence in this area. Moreover, we have 
considered how the prohibition of degrading treatment in Article 3 may provide the 
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Court with the scope to consider and address the adverse effects of excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage. 
 
It is our view that Article 3 provides the means to develop a holistic reading of the 
Convention Ð Òin such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between 
its various provisionsÓ Ð that significantly enhances the protection of sexual 
minorities.
133
 Article 3 provides such a means because it can be used to address 
numerous issues relating to human dignity, respect for which is the Òvery essence of the 
ConventionÓ
134
 and Òone of the most fundamental values of democratic societyÓ.
135
 The 
drafters of the Convention held the defence of human dignity in high regard Ð seeing the 
protection of human rights as the means to uphold Òthe conviction shared by us all that 
every man is worthy of respect, that every man has the right to live in safety and 
dignityÓ
136
 Ð and viewed it as a hallmark of European civilisation.
137
 Precisely for this 
reason and in order to keep the interpretation of the Convention in line with the 
Òincreasingly high standard [É] required in the area of [É] human rightsÓ,
138
 the Court 
has adopted a flexible approach when assessing the minimum level of severity of ill-
treatment under Article 3. Such flexibility, in our view, provides the Court with the 
opportunity to further develop its interpretation of sexual orientation discrimination 
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under Article 3 in order to expand the protection afforded to sexual minorities against a 
wide range of degrading treatment. If the Court pursued this developmental agenda its 
jurisprudence may more significantly contribute to securing the human dignity of gay 
men and lesbians in a way that is consistent with the demanding legacy of Article 3 and 
the universalistic aims of the Convention. 
 
